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A Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory JOHN C. CALDWELL
Our interpretation of past population mnovemenits anid our expectationis about future trends rest primarily on a body of observations and explanations known as "demographic transition theory." The convenitional wisdom of this theory has had a deep imnpact anid guides the work programs of international organizations, technical assistance decisions by governments, and popular analyses in the miiedia.
The theory has chaniged little in the last 20 years. Indeed the period has seen a plethora of anialyses of differentials in fertility, especially those found in contemporary American society, which have tended to obscure the all-importanit distinction between the origins of fertility decline and the subsequent demographic history of societies experiencing such decline.1 This failure to update the theory is curious because the last two decades have provided researchers with far more experience of pretransitional anid early transitionial societies thani they had previously been able to obtain.
It is also unfortuniate because it has led to unnecessary misunderstaindings, misinterpretations, and frustrations. It wvill be argued here that an inadequate understanding of the way in which birth levels first begin to fall has led both to premature gloom about the success of family planning programls and unnecessary hysteria about the likely long-term size of the humani race, as well as to anitagonisms at such forums as the Bucharest WVorld Population Conference between countries at different stag;es of demographic transition. 321 
Development and Testing of the Theory
The thrust of the paper is that there are only two types of fertility regime, with the exception of the situation at the time of transition: one where there is no economic gain to individuals from restricting fertility; and the second where there is often or eventually economic gain from such restriction. In both situations behavior is not only rational but economically rational. Another corollary is that there is not a whole range of economically rational levels of fertility in different societies, but instead only two situations, the first where the economically rational response is an indefinitely large number of children and the second where it is to be childless. It is admitted that in many societies at different times there is not a steep economic gradient between different levels of fertility; however, maximum and minimum family sizes in these societies are determined by personal, social, and physiological reasons, not economic ones. Further, it will be posited that the movement from a society characterized by economically unrestricted fertility to a society characterized by economically restricted fertility is essentially the product of social, rather than econiomic, change, although with economic implications. It will also be argued that the forces sustaining economically unrestricted fertility are frequently streingthenied by economic moderniizationi unaccompaniied by specific types of social chanjge and that this is the explanation for sustained high fertility in a situationi in which "modernization"-urbanization, increase in the proportioni of nionagricultural productioni, and so onis demonstrably occurring. The social revolution-one of familial relationlships anid particularly of the direction of intrafamilial flows of wealtl dictated by familial obligationis-lneed not by its nature accomnpany economic modernization. However, it almost inevitably will occur either simultaneously with, or to a considerable degree preceding and perhaps hastening, econiomic moderniization in the contemporary world. This is due largely to the pheniomenioni of Westernization, an essentially social process with a ranige of mechaniisms for its spread (which have depended on economic advance in the West and to a more limited extent elsevhere, but which have not been dictated or formed by economic growth), 2 The discussion will cover three types of society: (1) primitive societies vhere food gatherers, nomadic pastoralists or agriculturalists live in largely self-sufficient communities feeling little or no impact from a national state or a world religion; (2) traditional societies, predominantly agrarian, where the apparatus of a state government or the attitudes, and often the structure, of an organized religion make an impact on both community and individuals, especially in giving guarantee of safety or assistance; (3) transitional societies where rapid change in way of life towards that followed by people in lands with a "modern" economy usually in recent times has been catalyzed by outside contacts. It will be maintained that, at least in the contemporary world, the supports for unlimited fertility finally crumble in the transitional society, and that the analysis of this crumbling and of its preconditions is largely unrelated to the analysis of the frequently slow and sometimes vicissitudinous reduction in family size that subsequently occurs in transitional and modern societies. Much of the argument draws primarily on African examples, both because of my experience in Africa, and because all three types of society are well represenited on the continenit.
Demographic Transition Theory
By the end of the nineteenth century it was common knowledge that fertility levels vere fallinig in mainy Western countries and there was a presumption that birth rates would stabilize at lower levels (although there was no agreement about what the new levels would meaan in terms of natural increase). An atteml-pt was made by Warren Thomzpson in 1929 to divide this transition inito three phases and by C. P. Blacker in 1947 to distinguish five phases.) Neither could be said to be the father of demographic tranisitioni theory in that neither suggested anl explaniationi for fertility change.
Mlodern demographic transition theory was born almlost in mature form in a paper written by Frank Notestein in 1945. Notestein offered a twofold explanationi for why fertility had begun to decline. Fertility in premnodern countries had beeni kept, if not artificially high, then high only by the miainitenianice of a whole series of props: "religious doctrines, moral codes, laws, education, communiity customs, marriage habits and family organizations . . . all focused towards maintaining high fertility."4 High fertility was necessary for survival because otherwise the very high mortality rate would have led to population decline and extinctioln. But evenitually in country after country mortality began to decline, and the props were no longer nieeded or were not needed at their original strength. One could leave the explaniation here and argue that the props would inevitably wither, as social adjustmenits were made in response to other changes. However, Notestein put forward the view that, in the WVest at least, more positive forces (arising out of the same process of moderniization that had brought the death rates down) were at work destroying the props. Fundamental was "the growth of huge and mobile city populationis," which tended to dissolve the largely corporate, familybased way of life of traditionial society, replacing it with individualism marked above all by growing personal aspirations. Large families became "a progressively difficult undertaking; expensive and difficult for a popuirratioinality enlters inlto the theory is through references to cultural lags in ml-aking fertility adjustments to the arrival of the new urban, industrial conditionis. Such references are plausible in a way because a period of chang(,e is under conisiderationi instead of an extended stable situationi. Several of the quotationis above do refer also to such lags, but the concept is both implicit anid explicit in Notestein's 1945 paper. There he argued that the supports for high fertility "change only gradually and in response to the strongest stimulation" and described "a population increasingly freed from older taboos aind increasingly willing to solve its problems rather than accept them."15
That the central traditioni of demograplhic transition-theory is still very much that of Notestein's 1945 alnd 1953 formulatiolns and that the belief in increasin(g rationalitv with modernizationi is still an integral element has been demonstrated vividly by the publication of the most recent United Nations Population Studies, which justifies the latest United Nations population projections. The argument is worth quoting at some length:
The entire process of economic and social development . itself changes people's outlooks from traditions and fatalism towards modern concepts and rationalism....
The past record in the more developed countries demonstrates . . . that it [fertility decline] can . . . be expected to occur in the normal course of the modern development process . . . the deliberate regulation of fertility defies age-old custom. . . . A high frequency of clhildbirth . . . was necessary for the continuation and security of families and this found emphatically strong support in the prevailing values and customs. In many cultures it has also been considered that children provide a much needed insurance against destitution in old age. Associated with such cultural norms has been the regard for women in their seemingly priincipal function as bearers and rearers of children, limiting thereby their participationl in economic and social roles held to be mainly the prerogative of men. Interwoven with such attitudes there can also be a fatalistic refusal, or even an abhorrence, to contemplate aniy regulatory interference with the reproductory process. It is not to be wondered at that such a traditional outlook on life can be highly resistant to change. But as slhown by tlle earlier experience of the more developed regions . . . clhange is possible or eventtually to be expected. 16 Much of the argument for demographic transition concepts as they are now widely held turns on the definition of rational. The term "economically rational" is frequently substituted so as to avoid having to judge "social rationality" with the possibility of having to agree that a certain mode of behavior was rational in a given setting in that it met the ends of religious beliefs or of community obligations. Even so, the criteria employed are highly ethnocentric and are laden with Western values. It is assumed that it is rational for a man or a couple to maximize the expenditure on the individuals in his or their nuclear family; but there are aany number of noni-Western societies in which there is greater pleasure in spending on some relatives outside the nuclear family (adult brothers for instance) than on some within it, and in which children are happier to spend on parents than are parents on children. Obviously the fundamental choices are social ones and economic behavior is rational only insofar as it is rational within the framework established by social ends. What demographic transition theory has always regarded as rational are primarily Western social ends with economically logical steps to maximize satisfactions given those ends.
The underlying assumption of this study is that all societies are economically rational. The point is a simple one, but its acceptance is absolutely necessary if we are to arrive at an adequate theory of demo-graphic transition, if we are to understand the contemporary population changes, and if we are going to make adequate predictions for planning purposes. It is, in fact, difficult to have a rigorous analysis on any other assumption. Social ends differ but can be largely explained on a rational basis-usually even in economic terms. Furthermore, change in social ends can often be observed, measured, explained, and predicted. The view that the fertility behavior of the Third World arises largely from ifmorance and should be combatted with education and guidance is held strongly by many family planning movements and leads to friction and even confrontation; the same reaction arising out of much the same origins was witnessed writ a little larger at the Bucharest Conference. Indeed the view that peasants are usually mistaken in evaluating the effect of their fertility on their own economic well-being has recently been seriously argued in a paper by Mueller.17
A second implication of demographic transition theory, at least as originally conceived by Notestein, is that industrializatioin and concomitant urbanization are preconditions to development. Notestein placed stress on "urban industrial living" (in 1945) and later on "urban industrial society" (in 1953), as the context in which the social changes leading to fertility decline occur. Similarly Thompson (in 1946) referred to "industrialization" as the necessary condition. In the last 20 years such terms have largely been replaced by "modernization" or near synonyms like "the modern development process" as it became clear that great numbers of people in the Third World were unlikely to be living in industrial cities for generations. The demographic transition theory did allow for the possibility that the new way of life and the consequent new fertility behavior might be generated in the urban industrial setting and then be exported to nonurbani and nonindustrial populations either by exportin(g some of its institutionis (such as schools, women's rights legislation or a full market economy) or by simply exporting its attitudes or ideas. This tenet received historical support from the decline in fertility amiiong rural populationis in the WVest. The theory did not specify whether the urbani industrial melting pot from which the changes were derived had to be in the same society or whether a global economy and society was beginninig to operate that could export the necessary ideas and institutions from the economically developed countries to the commercial cities of Asia and Africa and on to the rural hinterlands. (Demonstrably this has long been happening with regard to governmental institutions and more recently in terms of schools and political ideology.) In any case the link with the emphasis on the props for high fertility is clear. If high fertility in developing countries were a wholly rational response to economic circumstances, then the small family pattern could never be exported; but, if the large family were to a considerable extent the product of beliefs and attitudes sustained largely by religion and shib-boleth in order to compete with high mortality rather than to meet the needs of the economic system, then export was quite possible. Those who doubted the validity of a theory based only on the transmission of ideas but who were prepared to accept the possibility that the spread of small families could be achieved by the spread of institutions made little progress in identifyiing those institutions that were minimally necessarv for fertility transition-schools? nonagricultural employment?
A third problem lurked in demographic transition theory but xvas not specifically identified. Was it primarily miodernization that was being exported? Is there a specific form of social modernization that is a necessary adjunct to economic modernization? Or is the export Westernization, which by historical accident has been tailored to fit the world's first economic modernization and which is easily exportable partly because of the NVest's econiomic strength (clearly visible in its earlier ability to colonize) and partly because this tailoring makes it easily adaptable to modernizing economies? Notestein wrestled with problem areas in his 1953 paper and the whole question of Westernization almost arose: why had fertility fallen steeply between World Wars I and II in almost wholly agricultural Bulgaria while failing to do so during the 1950s in the larger urbani areas of Egypt and the Far East?18 Suggested Modificationis to the Theory \Vithout actually sayinig as much, Davis argued in 1955 and again, with Judith Blake, in 1956 that the props were not needed. High fertility was a perfectly rational response to socioeconomic conditions in a traditional agrarian society: the extended family means that the cost and care of children are shared; children, once past infanicy, may in fact pay for their costs, especially in conditions of cottage industry, but more generally in anly farmiiing situation; both husbands' anid wives' families of origini miiay help establish the newly married couple, often on-a farm of their own; large families may bring economic strength through political strength in the local decision-making organiizations.'9
Recently this aspect of the demographic transitioni debate has beenl summarized and evaluated by Thomas Burch anid Murray Geindell, who demonstrated that research findings from India anid Taiwani fail to show the predicted fertility contrasts between-families residing as nuclear families and those living together in larger agglomerations of relativ,es.20 The point is an important one, and, in order to clear the way for the subsequent argumeent in this paper, should be dealt with here. The research in India aand Taiwaan is almost certainly irrelevant for three reasons, of which the second is most importaant. The first is that survey or census data do not accurately measure even residential famiiily size. The building materials, mud and stone in contrast to bamboo aand thatch for instance, often determine whether considerable numbers of people canl be housed in a single structure or alternatively in several smaller structures adjacent or close by. The seconid (a poinit to be elaborated later) is that famlily residenice arranigements have little or niothing to do with the true extended faamily of mutual obligationis, at least as long as residence outside the traditional comnmuniity is not specified. It is the size aild ramifications of this family of obligations that mray wvell help to determine fertility. The third is that family residenitial patternis are often a function of the life cycle; in somie societies nuclear residence is most likely to be found iimmii-ediately after husband and wife (often wvith children of their own by this timiie) first move awvay from their parents to a farm or business of their owni. What dem-ographers should really be interested in are the famiilies of this type who are unlikely to subsequently attract or retain many other relatives (except perhaps aged parents or nephewvs and nieces undergoing educationi) often because they have moved to a city or have been fairly highly educLated and so have opted for a different way of life fronm their relatives.
Family sociologists added some riders to the picture. William Goode decided that the nuclear family's fundamental demographic characteristic was not that it leaned towvard small size but that it was more flexible thani the extended family in reactinig to economic conditions favoring high or low fertility; thus at miiuch the same time (eighteenth and early ninieteenith centuries) European populations had choseni high fertility in fronitier North America anid moderate fertility in their homelands in Europe.21 This had, of course, been a major contention of Malthus. Some, Coliin Clark, for examiiple, wvent further anid identified nuclear famiiilies wvith advaniced economiiies anid extenided families with nonindustrial societies-probal)ly, as will be argued later, a funidamental mistake at least in terims of Europeani history.2" Another attack on the props caimie from David Heer and Dean Simiith who argued that the props had at every stage been wholly rational because of high imiortalitv aind had withered as the death rates fell.' Recetit Idea.s Ani important contribution in the 1950s was that of the econiomists, especiallv Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover in 1958 with a miajor analysis of Iindia, together with Mexico. WN,7hat is apt to be overlooked is that Coale anid Hoover accepted as their starting point the existingr demlogralphic transition theory,2'-aind that nmost of the subsequent economic analysis is indepenidenit of theories about when and if fertility is likely to fall. Coale and Hoover spelled out the economic inmplications of tranisition theory but they did not test its basic assumptions. Their aiialvses were esseiitiallv those of nmacroscopic data, and their main conclusion was that national economic growth is impaired if fertility levels too g,reatly exceed mortality levels. Hlowever, most nonspecialists received the mnessag,e that thev hlad showni conivincingly that high fertility is economically disadvantageous for every size of population unit, and the view that high-fertility agrarian families were behaving irrationally was given a powerful boost.
It is possible to extrapolate part of the argument from nationial populations to individual families: to suggest that lower fertility will produce a family age structure with a higher ratio of potential adult producers to child consumers than will high fertility and that fewer children will allow mothers to participate more in economic activity.) For reasonls analyzed below all these arguments ring somewhat hollowly in an actual agrarian society: childreni work at young ages; often the peasant's analysis is dynamic in contrast to the demographer's static one in that the peasant is thinking less of the present and more of safeguarding the future; and, in many societies, the peasant's wife already works long hours (freed from mindin(g the product of her recent fertilitv by the child care being practiced by the product of her earlier fertility).
Two years before Coale and Hoover's study appeared, R. Nelson had produced his "low-level equilibrium trap model." Subsequently Harvey Liebenstein made the model more specifically demographic, suggesting that in "backward areas" people are merely caught by circumstanices: they lack the inducement to save or invest and are unlikely to make quantum jumps in techlnology; as a result, per capita income remaiins static, mortality does not decline, and, hence, population does not groW. 26 The model does imply at least short-term rationality, although it could also be taken to mean that the society as a whole was incapable of planininig its course to a better future. A more important limitation is that the model seems to have no real significance for social theory (except for historical studies) in a world where societies are no longer isolated from each other anid where imported health technology means that population is growin(g increasingly fast, even in maniy societies with largely subsistenice economies.
In 1974 Juliani Simoni summnarized and assessed much of the research evidence available on fertility anid stage of econiomic development, coilcluding that "fertility is everywhere subject to much rational conitrol." He largely avoided the question of why-within this framework of rationlal decision-fertility decline sets in, contenting himself with pragmatically observing that "we may rely on the fact that, as educationi rises, fertility will fall" and that "if one wishes to reduce fertility, one should thinik about raising educational levels as well as aiding birth control."27
Since the 1950s, sociologists have contributed powerfully-not always intentionally-to the thesis of irrationality by apparently showing a substantial gap between desired and achieved fertility in the Third World (together with a smaller gap in developed economies). The origin of this formulation dated from the beginining of fertility studies, when the Indianapolis Survey of 1941 asked Americani respondents what they considered the ideal fanmily size. The concept of "niorms" had been one of the basic planks of modern sociology, and in the early 1960s Ronald Freedman applied it to fertility studies in a way that seemed to have implicationis not only for behavioral rationality but for behavioral econiomic rationality: "family size norms will tend to correspond to a numiber which maximizes the net utility to be derived from having children in the society or stratum." In developing countries, he concluded, "there may be a delicate balance of pressures towards higher fertility to ensure at least a certaini minimum number of children and counter pressures to minimize or eliminate an intolerable surplus of children under difficult subsistence conditions." 28
Durinlg the mid-1960s, knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP) surveys were used to measure desired or "ideal family size" in the developing world using questions about the "best" or "ideal" numliber of children or the family size that would be desired if the respondenit were to start her reproductive history all over again. Comparisonis made in 1965 between "desired" and actual fertility prompted WV. Parker Mauldin to state, "although it is niot yet true that people in the developing areas share the small family ideal, it is true that most of them no loniger want very large families," 29 and Berniard Berelsoni to calculate that, while ideal family size in the United States was 97 percenit of the achieved size, it ran<(ged in a niumlber of developinig countries betwveen 60 and 92 percent.:o The whole question of ideal family size is of the utmost importanice for the discussion of demographic transition theory in this paper. It is nlot niecessary to regard the gap between ideal anid achieved size as evidence of irrational behavior; indeed Berelson regarded it as arisinig from "lack of iniformation, services and supplies" anid this was the miiost commiiiioni position taken durinig the 1960s by technical aid organizations in the fanmily planniing field. Inideed the significant gcap-that created by the props, according to demographic tranisition theory-is essentially that between the family size wvhich wvould be dictated by economicallv rationial behavior and ideal family size. In fact there is little relationiship betwNeen the demogiraphic transitioni concern with the attainimeni-t of ecoIlomllic rationiality aind the KAP study attentioin to ideal famlily size; KAP studlies essentially attempt to miieasure potential conisumer demand, and in this they iagnore the issue of ration.ality except to the extent that it seems reasonable for a person to do what he waints to do. Some researchers appear to take it for g(ranited, however, that a movemenit in ideals is almost inevitably a movement toward rationality and, hence, evidence of the decay of the props.
There are three fundamental questions. The first is whether there are "norms" at all in the high-fertility situation. It will be argued here that econiomically there is no ceiling in primitive and traditional societies to the number of children who would be economically beneficial; the actual number is kept down because physiological and social problems arise from too frequent childbirth and the failure to cease childbearing at a certaini stage. Achieved fertility is a product of this conflict and can hardly be described as approximating a norm.3 I The second question is whether fertility behavior must be recTarded as mniainly economically motivated, or whether social nmotivations are also imlportanit or even dominanit-whether normiis, if they exist, aind fertility behavior can be taken as an1 approximate measure of the individual's reaction to economic circumstanices. Simon argues that fertility canl be takien to be primarily economically motivated and justifies "an important omniSsion [from his study] ... , social niorm-ls and values. The reasoni ... is that in the context of long-runi analysis, culture and values do tiot have indepenidenit lives of their oWIn." . This, it will be noted, is a direct assault on the props. This propositioni differs fromii that put forward in this paper in that the argument here is that fertility is econiomlically rationial onlv between certain limlits that are set by7 nonieconiomic factors; that there are two types of society, one in which it is econoimicallvy rationial for fertility to be ever lower, but in which a floor is interposed by nonieconomic considerationis, and the other, in which it is rational for it to be ever higher, restr-ained only by a nonieconomiic ceiling.
The third question is whether fertility caan be used -as a nmeasure of desired behavior. The apparent demonstration by the KAP surveys that there is a wide gulf between wlhat Third NVorld people Nwant to do anid what they succeed in doing introduced a large element of chbance (aind not raandom chbance at that) into the whole matter. It is perhaps impossible to study the motivation behind fertility decline if the populations of the Third NVorld habitually exhibit fertility well above wlhat both economic rationality and the attitudes miiolded by the props dictate. I suggest that this apparent gap is partly the product of the present ulnusual circumstances, but largelv an artifact of the method of investigation. Change is at presenit so rapid in many societies that there is a fast increase in the number of people who will economically benefit from lower fertility. However, the "ideal family" questions ultimately fail to nmealsure likely fertility behavior even under conditions of adequate access to contrace)ption because they are imported almost undigested from WNesterii society and containi a range of assumptions about noii-NVestern societies that will not bear up under examination. The fundamental problemii is the questioninig of a woman about the "best" number of children, as if the chief cultural thrust were optimization of famiiily size instead of a range of other concerns such as meeting the expectations of husband and other relatives, conforming with peer group behavior, and so on. In many surveys most respondents probably do not fully understaind the question. They know what the words meani, but they also know that they are being asked to define "best" in a modernizing sense by interviewers (and, behind them, some institution) who interpret "best" in a futuristic sense or in the sense of the elites. The "politeness response" is only a small part of the reaction.33 The "ideal family" question was shaped by WVestern, middle-class researchers, living in conjugal families in which husbands and wives consult each other over matters of reproduction and sex, and it achieves its greatest reliability among such people. In this paper it will be taken that achieved fertility everywhere comes close to being a rational response to the circumstances of the society.
In 1965 the publication of a United Nations study directed the attention of researchers to the prime importance of the changing conditions that lead to fertility decline at a poinlt identified as the "threshold." The analysis distinguished six levels of fertility, in what was essentially a cross-sectionial and niot anl historical analysis, but for further analysis combined the levels into two groups, one in which relatively low fertility had been achieved anid the other in which it had not. Every Asian and African population), except Japani, was in the high-fertility group, while, with the exceptioni of Albania, every European population in Europe, North America, anid Oceania was in the low-fertility group. In Latin America, only Argenitinia and Uruguay were among the low-fertility countries. The United Nations recognized that it was "perhaps no coincidence that most of the countries where fertility is lov . . . are in Europe and European-settled regions," concluding that "fertility levels might ... be due . . . at least partly to culturally determined circumstances affecting the interactions between fertility and economic and social chaniges." ' This dichotomy had the disadvaintage that the nations identified as being beyond the threshold had in many cases passed it long ago; and neither the niature of the actual threshold nor the chaniges sufficient to ensure movemenet across it were actually detected.:<5 Other attempts to apply or develop threshold analysis have been made. Etienne van de XValle and John Knodel failed to find it a usable tool when anialyzing fertility decline in France and Germany.:1", Dudley Kirk proclaimed the value of such an approach in 1971, and in 1975, together with Frank Oechsli, applied it to Latin America, calculating a "Development Index" anid relatinig it to declines in both mortality and fertility.37 But Oechsli and Kirk's data unmistakably evidence a cultural dichotomy: most of the countries with reduced fertility either are areas of almost purely European settlement in the extreme south or are Caribbean Islands with very mixed cultures and population origins. Island nations have been conlspicuous in recent fertility declines, and the Unlited Nations has identified ten and attempted to explain the change in terms of their small size and hence the easy penetration of ideas and health measures.,3 Yet seven of the island nation-s were settled entirely by immigraant populations while under European control: Reunion, Jamaica, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Puerto Rico; one has been entirely Christianized: American Samoa; one is a mixture of an immigrant population and a fully Christianized indigenous one: Fiji; and one has achieved universal Western-style education: Sri Lanka.
In contrast to the approach of the thresholders, there has recently been renewed interest in the innovational explanation. (In the late nineteenth and early twenitieth centuries, governments and other institutions almost invariably explained fertility control innovationally, as the spread of pernicious ideas.) Much of this has arisen from the Princeton Office of Population-Research Europeani fertility project and its demonstration that fertility declines spread fairly rapidly through linguistic or religious units only to be halted at their borders.39
The threshold and innovational approaches share a common problenm in explaininig the onset of fertility decline. Their data are usually for coilsiderable aggregates of population, and, hence, it is difficult to determine whether the measured drop in fertility is attributable to a single socioeconomic group or not. If it is, then the threshold explanation holds up (provided that the threshold indices are meant to apply to subsections of a society), but the spread of innovation is shown to have an impact only oil groups that have alreadv reached some potential state of receptivity as measured by socioeconomic indices and not by attitudinal changes; if it is not, then the threshold indices can be discarded as measures of the sufficient conditions that must be met for demographic change to occur. In any case both approaches have failed as yet to specify the kinds of changes necessary for individuals or couples to alter their fertility behavior and why such alterations take place.
Attempts have of course been made to investigate these changes around the beginning of transition, the most ambitious to date for developing countries being the East-WVest Population Institute's Value of Children Study.4 So far the published national reports (on the Philippines and Hawvaii) have had a strong social psychological orientation toward beliefs and values-stronger even than the questionnaires upon which they are based. The approach is clearly an aspect of innovational theory anid has a good deal in common with explanations that rely heavily on the props; and, although it does not spell it out, the Philippines report could be described as an analysis of the import and diffusion of nonindigenous cultural values. So far, the project has insufficiently investigated the changing material aspects of life and the extent to which changin(g values could be said to be rationally moving parallel to economic realities.
New Experience Increasingly massive family planning programs in Asia and parts of Africa, Latin America, and Oceania over the last quarter of a century have presented an enormous increase in opportunities to watch and measure fertility transition and to identify the innovators. This should have allowed demographic transition theory to be rewritten with the sureness that arises from large-scale field experiments. This has not happened, and one of the keys to the whole problem may be why it has not happened.
An important reason is undoubtedly described by the well-known precept in other areas of endeavor: applied science has increasingly limited returnis, unless based on continuing fundamental research. Too muclh of the research has taken as its startincg point and framework the preexisting conclusions of demographic transition theory. Too many frustrated fanmilv planninc fieldworkers anid administrators have been only too willing to blame the props for the failure to achieve program targets. 'Most indigenous aind all expatriate adminiistrators and advisors are in circumL-stances in which they economically benefit from controlling their own fertility, aind they finid it hard to understand why this should not be so for everyone else-irrationality is an easy answer especially when it can be demonstrated that educationi and demand for the family planning services are highly positively correlated. Probably too much of the research has been programn-based instead of concentrating on the mechanisms of change in the society as a whole. Yet this is not the whole explanation. The operational research has permitted the identification of large numbers of innovators-at least in terms of using contraception, if not alwavs in terms of deciding to restrict family size-but research has not clearly established the basic changes that have affected these people. On the face of it this seenms hard to believe, and yet it is true for a number of reasons. One (as will be seen below) is that the innovators do not really know themselves; they differ in various ways from their parlents aind these differences make fertility control rational, but they usually canniot identify the essential differences. Another reason for the failure to identify preconditionis is that comparison of the characteristics of family planning acceptors and nonacceptors shows that the former are much more likely to exhibit not merely one "modern" characteristic but a whole interrelated set (more eduLcation, nonagricultural employment, higher incomes, and so on), so that there is a chicken-and-egg problenm. There has also been a research failure: failure to investigate in detail the way of life and circumstances of individual acceptors parallel to similar studies of the populationi as a whole.
In relationi to the last point it might be noted that there has been over the last half century a considerable advance in economic anthropology, which has been almost entirely ignored by demographers.41 Fierce debate has raaged in economic anthIropology betxNveen the Formalists and the Substantivists, the former claiming that Western economic analysis can be applied unchanged to all economic life and the latter maintaining that economics serves social ends and that every culture has its own economic theory. The Formalists narrowly define the subject of modern economics as allocation of scarce resources between either unlimited or numerous ends, while the Substantivists contend that rational economic behavior is rational only within a given social context and that these contexts are diverse and often startlingly different from those of the modern West. The Substantivists have also established that, even where money and markets exist, these may embrace only part of a society, and, more importantly, olnly part of the life of much of the population. The rest of the society, and perhaps the bulk of the life of most of its citizens, falls in the more traditional sector, where it is not rational, and usually not possible, to act out the life of market-economy man. The implications for demographic transition theory are that transition is made possible only by profound changes in the social structures of such societies, and that analyses of the economic rationality of high fertility reach different conclusions in different social structures.
Fundamental Problems of Research Part of the failure to advance demographic transition theory can undoubtedly be blamed on inadequate research. The basic problem has not been inadequate methodology but rather poor application, especially in the application of methods in cultures other than those for which they wvere developed. The problems will only be summarized here as they have been treated more adequately elsewhere. The general failing, and one that encompasses the others, has been ethnocentricity. Too much research has been done too quickly and on too large a scale with research instruments, and often researchers, brought directly from contemporary Western society. Too often, the representatives of the non-Western society in the research have been completely inculcated xvith Western research approaches and conclusions in Western universities. As a result, the research approach often predetelmines the range of findings and asks questions that provide the appropriate answers almost by an echo effect.42 What prevents the researcher from worrying about the extent to which the pattern of responses fails to represent the society is the magnitude and flow-chart nature of modern social scientific research: the large sample, the hierarchy of command, the precoded questionnaire, the responses as invisible magnetic recordings on a computer tape, computer editing, the computer print-outs of marginals and cross-tabulations that necessarily balance to the last unit, the written report in a predetermined pattern, and finally the crosscultural international comparison with other research using similar or even identical instruments.
Four pitfalls of current research have particularly contributed to misunderstanding of the nature of demographic transition.
1. The magnitude and direction of wealth (money, goods, services, guarantees) flows and potential flows are areas of research that are often neglected or misunderstood. Such research is difficult. In premodern societies much of the wealth is still outside the monetized economy. Often money-equivalents are not visualized; services usually have an element of obligation; investments in future security may be discounted in the opposite direction to that to which Western economics is accustomed (discussed further below); the details about wealth have often not been disclosed even to immediate relatives (who exert competing demands and from whom details must often be hidden, more to prevent resentment and to allow equity to prevail, than to deprive people of their just deserts); and there is sometimes also a fear about tax officials and other authorities knowing about earnings. In these circumstances, small-scale, painstakingly thorough research is needed by investigators with a thorough knowledge of the society. Hardly any good research has yet been done. There is a temptation to quote inadequate or incomplete research, with highly misleading results. There would be less danger if the errors were random, but, without question, there is a great understatement of all flows of wealth and potential wealth.
2. The "family" of the fertility survey is often an artifact of the survey. Women are asked about their own reactions and their husbands' reactions, and of course, the women answer in these terms. No one describes the role in decision-making of the husbands' and wives' lineages; no one explains that the lhusband regards his brother as a nearer relation than his wife in the sense of that close inner circle where one no longer regards expenditure as depriving one personally of wealth; no one explains the intricate system of decisionmaking and obligations that may far exceed the nuclear family or residential group and in which the nuclear family may not even be a recognizable subunit.
3. The nature of family formation and of related decisions in developing countries is frequently misunderstood. Family size decisions are usually out of the respondents' hands for several reasons: both the physiological side of reproduction and the obeying of cultural practices may seem (sensibly enough) to them to be something they cannot control and hence there is an element of fatalism; family size is often the product of decisions taken for family reasons not primarily aimed at determining fertility; and, where there are decisions to be made, they may not be primarily decisions of the "couple." All these factors must be taken into account when interpreting "Up to God" and "Don't know" responses, which may be closer to the truth than the numerical ones. In these circumstances the value of any "ideal family" type of question is debatable, and the employment of the concept of "norms" misleading.
4. While fertility transition research is essentially a study of change, such investigations have been impeded by too much emphasis on modernization. Change can be understood only if emphasis is given to studying the fundamental nature of the society that is being subjected to new forces. Too many survey questions are focused on the modernizing features, and too many of them have a built-in assumption that everyone is reaching for such change. Demographers have been far too rarely concerned with familiarizing themselves witlh the knowledge other social scientists hlave already accuimulated about the society being examined. Perhaps even more serious is the fact that modernization has been accorded such respect (by all development researchers, but specifically by poptulation researchers, in that they regard modernization as being the clhief mechanism for reduicing fertility and hence eventuially containing global population growthl) that its components have usuially not been anialyzed aind the all-impor-tant distinction has liot been made between Westernizationi, which may proceed at a rate unrelated to economic change, and residual moderniizationi, whlich must go hand in lband with economic change beccause it is eitheri a necessar-y conidition or a necessary produict.
XVhat we obtain from research that is vitiated by these weaknesses is a reflection of the way a poorer version of our own society might be expected to behave if set down in a Third World context. We fail to appreciate significantly different social and economic structures and the extent to which these yield rewards to the highly fertile.
A Society Experiencing Change
The The Primitive Society A primitive society is one in which the largest organizational institution is the tribe, the clan, or the village. No overall responsibility is taken by the larger apparatus of State or Church, which means that security within the groupings that exist is not augmnented or guaranteed by an outside entity. Indeed, security outside the group is minimal; nearly everyone continues to live among their people of origin; and the size of that group is often the measure of safety.
Several aspects of such a society are of prime importance for understanding all pre-demographic-transition societies.
Perhaps the foremost is that the society or economy (for they cannot be separated) of the group is a single system in which the participants have time-honored roles and duties. There is usually communal land (which is essential in nomadic, food-gathering, and most shifting-cultivation systems); residence in propinquity to large numbers of peoplemostly relatives-with whom one has lived all one's life; government by these same people; and a simple economy where much cooperation is needed for the larger tasks. The absolute right of individual ownership is unknown. In fact economic relations and social relationships intermingle. Edward Evans-Pritchard wrote of the Sudan, "One cannot treat Nuer economic relations by themselves, for they always form part of direct social relationships of a general kind,"45 and C. K. Meek of Nigeria, "One of the main distinctions between Native systems of holding land and those of Western societies is that the former are largely dominated by personal relationships, whereas the latter are subject to the impersonal legal conception of 'contract'."46 Marshall Sablins summarized the position as, "A material transaction is usually a momentary episode in continuous social relations."4 Transactions and gifts are not in fact markedly differentiated, especially as the latter are almost invariably also the cause of two-way flows of wealth.
Gifts of goods or services and later reciprocation allow the creation of a security system of mutual obligations (which will be dealt with in this review of the primitive society, even though such systems are of fundamental economic and demographic importance in traditional and transitional societies and survive even into inodern society48 ). In all primitive and most traditional societies the maximization of profit or other ends in good times is of small importance compared with the minimization of risks (which often means ensuring survival) in bad times. Networks of relatives are important in the primitive society and remain so in the traditional society. They increase the size of the security system and of the cooperating group in less serious situations; they increase the number of close allies in the political contest in the traditional political system in which success is due to the ability to tap more or better communal resources; they increase the number of relatives who can attend family ceremonies and hence magnify one's social importance and sheer consumption pleasure. In rural Yoruba society it is still taken as one of the immutable facts of existence that family numbers, political strength, and affluence are not only interrelated but are one and the same thing. Furthermore, such a base still forms an excellent springboard to success for young aspirants in the modern sector of the economy.54 There are only two ways of increasing the size of one's network of relatives and they are interrelated: by reproduction and by the marriage of one's children. Data from the second survey in the Nigerian segment of the Changing African Family Project show that 80 percent of all Yoruba still hold that children are either better than wealth or are wealth, while those who maintain that on balance they consume wealth fall to 6 percent in rural areas; 96 percent agree that increasing the number of relatives by means of marriage is a good thing and 83 percent that they can ask relatives by marriage for help with material things or services to a greater extent than they can ask nonrelatives.
But, if this is the way to wealth and power, why do extra children not press more on resources, especially on the supply of food? The question seems to have no meaning in most primitive societies and in traditional society amonig the Yoruba, even in densely settled rural areas or among urban populations. Part of the answer is that each new pair of hands helps to feed the extra mouth (to paraphrase the kind of proverb that seems to be found widely in Africa and Asia). Part is the nature of the communal economy, where "a man does not acquire more objects than he can use; were he to do so he could only dispose of them by giving them away."35 Indeed, in such an economy underuse of resources may be far more common than pressure upon them, a situation generalized in Sahlins' rephrasing of Chayanov's rule: "the intensity of labour varies inversely to the relative working capacity of the producing unit [i.e. the household or family].">'; Lorimer constructed a model for agrarian societies, which apparently showed that, even if belt-tightening was caused in some families by the birth of extra children, it was only to a smaall extent while the children were young.57 Less than one-fifth of Yoruba respondents in the second survey of the Nigerian segment of the Changinig African Family Project believed that the birth of an extra child would have even an immediate impoverishing effect.
Africain children certainly work (except perhaps in the transitional society), beginning at age 5-7 years, as they imitate ever more what their elders of the same sex do. It is often difficult, even among adults, to distinguish vork completely from way of life. Nevertheless, the traditionlal patriarch appreciated that work had to be donie, that it was often onierous, and that more could be done and others could perhaps take a larger share of the burden if the family were large. C. Edward Hopen relates that he discussed with a Fulani of northern Nigeria whether the Fulani, who supposedly are filled with joy by fathering large families, would have many children in the happy Moslem Heaven that they describe, only to be told: "No, why will we want children? All the work will be done by the servants of Allah."58 Pierre de Schlippe, reporting on the Zande of south-west Sudan states that, "The prestige of extensive fields and full granaries was to a great extent achieved by family despotism," including "cruel punishments inflicted on wives and children."59 This is not now the case among either the Zande or the Yoruba, but in rural areas wives and children obey male instructions to work (see below on the question of schoolchildren). Yoruba children work as they have always done helping to provide nonmarket goods and services, as well as helping with market production. That a man benefits economically in such a society by polygyny is now widely affirmed60; it is a small step from this to recognizing that he also gains if he has a large number of children.
Traditional Society In Yoruba society the difference between primitive and traditional society is hardly worth making when analyzing demographic trends; but the establishment of the latter was undoubtedly the necessary precursor for fertility change in the transitional society. However, this has not been the case in all traditional societies, many of which evolved slowly over a long period,61 and indeed the beginning of fertility transition can almost certainly be found in Europe at a time when it was still very largely premodern. State and Church, long before the advent of the Welfare State, were able to provide some assurance that they would intervene to try to prevent unnecessary deaths at times of community disaster-in Europe, with intermissions, since the time of the Ancient World, and over considerable parts of China over the centuries. This may well have weakened the need for the extended family in that the family was no longer the ultimate guarantor of survival. This was probably particularly the case where the authority of the State impinged most strongly and for the longest periods: for instance, in the Ancient World, in Metropolitan Rome, and, especially, in the City of Rome. It is difficult to examine Augustus's marriage laws without concluding both that the extended family at least was under pressure and that a subsequently reversed fertility decline was under way. Rome, as Gibbon so eloquently related, never really died away in Europe: the Church inherited the marriage laws anid the attitudes that framed them, as well as responsibility for those in critical circumstances; the manor guaranteed employment and set conditions on access to land, which not only implied that family nuicleation (in the econiomic sense of responsibilities) was well advanced but also reinforced that nucleation (and possibly held fertility in eheek bv preventing early marriage).f 2 Traditional societies with their greater overall organization either introduced or increased the use of money. This, together with their greater guarantees of security to the traveler, expanded trade. WVith their national legal systems, they were more likely to move toward freehold tenure of land, although the demographic transition theorist should note how recently communal tenure has been important in non-European parts of the world. In fact, in most of sub-Saharan Africa freehold land still exists on only a very limited scale. All these changes had implications for the family.
Wealth Flows in Primitive and Traditional Societies6" As analyzed by anl outsider from a modern society, children have demonstrable values of several different types in primitive and traditional societies. They do a great deal of work for or with their parents not only when young but usually during adulthood as well; they accept responsibility for the care of parents in old age; they eventually bolster the family's political power and hence give it economic advantages; they ensure the survival of the lineage or family name and in many societies undertake the necessary religious services for the ancestors.
This list, like much value of children research, obscures two very important points.
The first is that such disaggregation is a product of external observation or, even more significantly, of hindsight. In relatively unchanging societies no one sees these separate bonuses conferred by fertility. The society is made of a seamless cloth: children fit into an unintrospective society where they behave as their parents behaved and where their role is to work when young and to care for the old. This is why they may have great trouble in listing any good things (or bad things) about large families when asked by the researcher. Indeed, the respondents' ability to see clearly the separate aspects of children's value shows that the old system is already crumbling and that children's roles are not as certain as before. These roles, then, become important in what is now the transitional society and help to explain the options and decisions of such a society.
The second point is that the value of children to the lineage and ancestors is not really a prop with a strength of its own. Rather, this aspect of the role of children reflects the fact that the other aspects conducive to high fertility are positive as well. When the other props begin to deteriorate in the transitional society, so does the concern for ancestors (often with the help of imported religions, or new interpretations of existing religions, or the spread of secularism).
Nevertheless it is important for the analyst of a society moving toward transition (and this is true of most developing countries) to identify the nature and magnitude of the intergenerational wealth flows in the society. In pretransitional and essentially rural societies, at least six different economic advantages of children to one or both parents can be distinguished: (1) Situational gain is of particular importance to patriarchal males. The obsession with per capita analysis has obscured this type of gain. In Yoruba society there is nothing approaching an equal division of wealth or consumption within the family: there are inequalities by sex, age, and family status. As the number of children beyond infancy grows, and, indeed, as the number of wives and ultimately the number of children-in-law increases, it is inevitable that the person on top of the pyramid controls more resources and has access to more services (as well as enjoying more obvious power), even if per capita income remains static. (2) Children work in the household and on the farm not only producing goods but providing a range of services that adults regard as wholly or partly childreni's work and that they are loath to do themselves: carrying fuel, water, messages, and goods; sweeping; looking after younger siblings; caring for the animals; weeding the crops; and so on. (3) Adult children usually assist their parents, especially with labor inputs into farms (which frequently increase as the parents age) and with gifts, to a much greater extent than-the older generation readily admits or than is spontaneously reported to survey interviewers by either parents or children. (4) Adult children provide particular assistanlce in making up the family contributionis to community festivities and to such family ceremonies as marriages, funerals, and celebrations connected with births. (5) The care of aged parents, who may insist oIn having their farms, businesses and households propped up as if they were still running them, can be a major undertaking. (6) Parents can invest in training or education of children so as to increase their ability to make returns (although the motive is usually only partly economic anid is much more complex than is baldly stated here).
The key issue here, and, I will argue, the fundamental issue in demographic transition, is the direction and ma gnitulde of intergenerational wealth flows or the net balance of the two flows-one from parents to children and the other from children to parents-over the period from when people become parents until they die. In premodern society much of the flow is indirect, because of the existence of extended families, clans, and even villages that share in these flows, and because the child's contribution to the parent may be largely by the augmentation of political strength to allow the tapping of a larger share of the communal wealth. The concept of a net balance is still valid, however, even if difficult to measure. It may even be closer to the truth in the older traditional village to speak of the flow being from the younger to the older in the community as a whole with the parent-child relationships in each family playing only a secondary role.
In all primitive societies and nearly all traditional societies the net flow is from child to parent. This is often partly obscured (especially in recent times) from the researcher by the very mechanisms that help to keep it working and to some degree determine the magnitude of the flow. Parents continually point out to children how much they have done for them and how much the children owe (not specifically as money or goods, but more as duty, which in the end means much the same thing). Such protestations may not have been needed in primitive society; to a large extent they help to provide guarantees in a changing and increasingly uncertain society. Three points should be noted. First, such protests are heard most in societies where the wealth flow is still from child to parent; they are much less a feature of a society where the flow has been firmly established toward the child. Second, the protests are not likely to bear much relation to the size of the family and hence to the size or reality of the outlay. Third, the researcher is likely, on hearing the protests and recording them as responses in his questionnaire, to take them as evidence of the economic disadvantages or even irrationality of high fertility. The protests are likely to be supported by details of actual expenditure, without equal concern for details of the returns, and these the researcher may regard as quantified data. There is evidence from one study of a region adjacent to Nigeria that the work of single, adult sons is so important to fathers that they deliberately use their control of bride wealth and marriage ceremonies to space out and postpone sons' marriages so as to organiize an even flow of the labor first of unmarried sons and eventually of grandchildren. 64 There is then a great divide, a poinlt where the compass hesitatingly swings around 1800, separating the earlier situation in which the net flow of wealth is toward parents and in which hence high fertility is rational and the later situation in which the flow is toward children and in which hence nio fertility is rational. \Vhy the divide is where it is, and why the compass swings, will be our major concern when investigating the transitional society.65
What this means is that before the divide economic rationality dictates unlimitedly high fertility. On the whole, discussion and even survey work in African primitive and traditional society seem to support this. Fertility is limited for all kinds of noneconomic reasons (some of which, however, like child survival, have economic implications). In Yoruba society, the Nigerian segment of the Changiing African Family Project found that easily the most important reason is the spacing of births so as to contain infant and early childhood mortality and, hence, to maximize the number of living children. The second most important reason (at least in the past, because it has now been displaced in importance by delayed marriage) has been the cessation of sexual relations by a woman on the birth of the first granidchild so as to avoid the social and psychological tension arising from competing maternal and grandmaternal obligations. Other reasons have been the cessation of sexual relations in some cases when the husband takes another wife or when he moves elsewhere to work or because the woman feels increasingly old or battered by reproduction. Increasingly, fertility is being held in check by postponed age at marriage, which in the case of females already averages several years past puberty; this postponement arises out of competition with education or job opportunities and holds fertility in check because it is accompanied by continence, less sexual activity than in marriage, contraception, or abortion. Wbhen the numbers of children become really large, they raise problems of control, noise, and emotional deprivation even in rural societies. The list of noneconomic reasons is quite formidable and is incontrovertible evidence that economic rationality alone is unlikely to determine fertility in any society.
Similarly, after the economic divide, economic rationality dictates zero fertility. This does not happen, and fertility often falls slowly and even irregularly, again for social and psychological reasons-the extent to which alternative roles are available to women, the degree to which child-centeredn-ess renders children relatively expensive, the climate of opinion, aind so on1.Y!6 Fertility does not reach zero for reasonls that are entirely psychological and social.
It is then necessary to attempt to imeasure intergenierational wealth flows, an endeavor that is rendered difficult in pretrainsitional society by a host of problems: much of the flow is not direct but is derived from the extra political power exerted by a man with many children, especially grown-up sonls aind daughters married into other families; much of the flow is not moniey but goods anid services; some of the flow forms part of family contributions to meet community obligation-s anid does not reaclh the parenits at all; most people have good reason for diffidence about revealing the total flow of wealth, or at least that received. All of these difficulties except the last diminish as the economy becomes more monetized and society more urbanized, an-d hence transitionial society allows easier measuremiienit. Attempts to measure the near-lifetime return on investmenit in children as well as the outflow from older children were made in Ghania in 1963, and a more comprehenisive attempt to examin-e inter(renerational money flows was made in Nigeria's Western State in 1974-75. Both showed clearly that return-s from children are substantial.67
It is essential to emphasize that the divide is not mechaniistically deternmined by economic conditioins. On the contrary it is almost entirely a social phenomenion (except that parent-child net flows of wealth, with the exception of labor anid other services such as care for the very young and very old, are hardly possible in subsistence condition-s or in the primitive society), anid canl be reached only when the economy of the nuclear family has been largely isolated from that of the extended family and wbhen a subsequent change of balance has occurred within the nuclear family. The necessity for economic nucleation arises in several ways: the chbange of economic balance inside the nuclear family is essentially one of emotion and sentiment, wvhich requires emotional nucleation (and other chan(ges of emotional balan-ce within the family) that is incoimlpatible with the extended family economic system, which also needs a parallel system of emotional obligations to work; the change of economic balanice in the nuclear family really means that the parents of the family are wholly in charge of their own family economy.
Even if the divide would probably eventually be reached in ainy urban-inidustrial society, attitudes and social organization could long delay its advent. Alternatively, a different set of circumstances could brinig it on early, even, in fact, before the creation of the moderln economy. This seems to be wvhat happened in Western-Europe.68 The feudal system, built on the iniherited ruins of the urban-ized civilizationis of the ancient world, went far toward making, a nuclear family economiiically viable. Doubtless, economic obligtations existed to more distanlt relatives. But these obligations wvere supported by m-oral forces anid xvere susceptible to the weakenin(g or reversal of those forces. This seems to have happened wvith the rise of Protestanitism, which put much store on selfsufficiency of all tvpes aind oni moderationi in expenditure and desires. It allowed a miian to tell his relatives that they should be nmore careful in their expeniditures, miiore fruglal in their wants, anid more foresighted in Planningr for timiies of need. Mlore importantly, it allowed him to do this aniid ca.utiously refuse to give any (or ml-uch) assistanice, while retaininig his pride aind even preaching his practice. Given that the divide had been reached, fertility could be increasingly controlled, even if, at first, mostly by postponed mlarriage.
In Africa, substantial support for the thesis that emotional nucleation precedes econiom-lic nucleationi comes from a study in Ghania 'where Opponog showed amlonlcg mniale unidergraduates at two nniversities a significanit correlation between the kind of family anid kinship obligations the stuidents believed in aind the num--ber of children they wanlted and an ealrlier study by the writer that presented evidence on the extent to which urban elite families were emiiotion-ally turninig in uponi themselves. To get children far up the educational ladder and into the high-salary positiolns three stratagems are necessary: relatives outside the nuclear family must be encouraged to help with school fees or with accommodation and subsistence at centers where the right educational institutions exist; older children must help the younger ones in the same way (the sibling chain of educational assistance); and priority must be given to channeling the most assistance, at least early in the establishment of the sibling chain, to the children with the most chance of success-usually the brightest but occasionally those with unusual application, although the distinction is not often made. The first and second stratagems depend on the retention of the system of mutual obligations; the second and third work best with high fertility. The society, like many others in the Third World, believes that the birth of bright and potentially successful children is a matter of capricious fate to which some kind of probability can be assigned (the lucky dip, or lottery, principle) and that large families are likely to have one or more of such children whose existence far outweighs any disadvantages arising from a larger number of less successful siblings. Poor people have limited investment opportunities in such societies, and economic and political caprice can upset what appears to exist, so educational investment in children is thought to be the best investment in both Nigeria and Ghana, and doubtless in many similar societies. The child who has broken through to a job in the modern economy can assist the parents through flows of wealth (sent regularly and at times of crisis, brought on visits, or spent on visiting parents and siblings) or through influencing authorities and manipulating power; the child can bring honor to the parents by visiting them; and can give them access to the joys of the modern world during their visits or final retire-ment to the child's house. Children in urban areas are usually needed to bring earnings into the household, in circumstances where the total income of a poor household is often the sum of many small parts.4
Contraception may in the future be used largely to limit family size, but for the time being there is a substantial and increasing demand for contraceptives in Ibadani for other, more pressing reasoins: to substitute for female sexual abstinence after birth (in a world where the message of the enjoyment of sexual relationis is increasingly being heard); to permit sexual relations during the increasingly long period before marriage in a situation in which pregnancy might destroy the investmenlt in education or dictate a marriage regarded as less than desirable by the family; or to allow safe extramarital sexual relationis in a society in which long periods of abstinenice, substantial age gaps between spouses, and late marriage of males have meant that discreet relations of this kind have been to a large measure condoned.
More work needs to be done on individuals and families in dire poverty in both traditional and transitional societies. WVe have investigated a considerable number of cases in West Africa and one point seems clear: they are most likely to be products of an atypically inadequate family structure-often one that has been greatly eroded by mortality and that was vulnerably small in the first place because of accidenit or subfertility.
Identification of the Primary Forces of Change
The transitional niature of Ibadan society also allows the identification of the extent, nature, and cause of fertility transition. This is best done by identifying the innovators. Two methods were employed in the Changing African Family Project. The first was the isolation of all those women in Ibadan (together with their husbands where the marriage was a first, monogamous one with the husband still present) who had inidubitably succeeded in demographic innovation: women already over age 40 years with fewer than six live births achieved by intention and any method of restricting fertility. 7 The second was the examination of all women in the three 1973 Nigerian surveys who, regardless of age at the time, had had fewer than six live births, but desired no more and were at the time employinig modern contraception to try to ensure this.
The first point established was that there are still very few demographic innovators. Ibadan contains about 62,500 women over age 40 years, but only 438 or 0.7 percent had intentionally and successfully restricted fertility to less than six births.76 Women of all ages with fewer than six live births and using modern contraception to avoid further pregnancies numbered less than 2,000 in Ibadan, out of about 153,000 women aged 15-49 (or 1.3 percent) or about 128,000 aged 20-44 (about 1.5 percent) .
The size of this demographically innovating group (i.e. under 2,000) can be compared with the number of so-called family planning innovators, for in 1973 the number of Ibadan women practicing modern contraception was over 17,000 or almost nine times as many. In the whole of the \Vestern and Lagos States (which include rural areas but which also contain Lagos with its 2 million people and rapidly changing society as well as nmany other towns), only 0.5 percent of women are currently demoglraphic innovators according to the first Nigerian survey. The 1.5 percent of demographic innovators in Ibadan can also be compared with the numbnber of socioeconomic innovators: 46 percent of women have had schooling, and 15 percent have experienced at least some secondary education; most have their childreni of school age in full-time education; one-tenth are employed in the modern sector of the economy; one-third of the husbands work in nioiinmanual occupations, while no more than one-fourth could be said to be employed in the traditional sector of the economy. Clearly, continuing high fertility is not explained by lack of access to or even use of conitraception, or by only limited modernization, or by children still nmaintaining the occupational roles they filled in traditional rural society.
The problem is, then, to study the demographic innovators in depth and to find out how and wheni they separated themselves from the rest of the community. The quest should be easy. One might infer from demographic transition theory that the decision to do without the props might well be traumatic, and some demographers have wished that they could talk to the eighteenth-century French couples who first daringly decided to innovate. In fact, at first the most frustrating and then the most illuminating discovery was that the demographic innovators are for the most part unaware that they have done anything unusual. After all, contracepting is no longer unusual, particularly in the educational and social groups to which most belong. The use of such contraception to limit family growth just seemed an obvious thing to do in their economic circumstances.
The fundamental question is theni: WVhat were the economic circumstances of this group and how did they differ from others who were supporting children at school? The first hint is given by some of their characteristics: demographic innovators compared with noninnovators are 1.6 times as likely to have been to school and 2.7 times as likely to have been to secondary school; they are 2.0 times as likely to have husbands in nonmanual occupations, 4.5 times as likely to be in such occupations themselves, and 2.5 times as likely to have had fathers in such occupations; they are 6.5 times as likely to have all these characteristics-to have fathers and husbands in nonmanual occupations and to be in such occupations themselves and to have had secondary education. Back-ground and education are more important than current occupational experience or indeed any other contemporary circumstance or experience.
These findings could be said to be consonant with the knocking away of the props. However, the Nigerian segment of the Changing African Family Project contained a battery of questions and propositions of a psychosocial kind, relating to phrases taken from Yoruba proverb or song and of a type that could be made in a semi-philosophic way in everyday conversation. The responses showed clearly that what distinguished the demographic innovators from others was not their lack of superstition or their rationalism but their attitudes toward family and children. They have emotionally nucleated their families; they are less concerned with ancestors and extended family relatives than they are with their children, their children's future, and even the future of their children's children. They are more likely to have been "spoilt" themselves in the sense that their parents gave them more emotion and wealth than they expected back, and this is the way they tend, although usually to a greater extent, to treat their own children.77
What causes this emotional nucleation of the family whereby parents spend increasingly on their children, while demanding-and receivingvery little in return? Not the urban-industrial society, at least to the extent that it has developed in Ibadan. The majority of the society, even among the elite, is still one where net wealth flows over a lifetime from child to parent. Nor is that majority system buffeted by the institutional requirements of the modern economy; on the contrary it can adapt not only well but profitably to such a society. It might well be able to continue and improve the adaption for decades, or perhaps generations, except for the factor that has already brought about change among the small minority of demographic innovators.
That factor is undoubtedly the import of a different culture; it is Westernization. Just as Western ethnocentricity has bedeviled Third World research and introduced wholly inappropriate attitudes, assurnptions and methods, it has in a perversely negative way upset the whole study of "modernization" (i.e. the social changes that seem to precede, accompany, or follow economic development). Western researchers have all too frequently decided to become "objective" or at least "non-selfcentered" by achieving the almost incredible feat of omitting transmitted European cultural traditions from the study of modernization; it is like leaving Hellenization out of an examination of social change in fifth century BC Macedonia or leaving Roman social influences out of a treatise on Britain in the second century AD. This may sound like hyperbole, but it is not. In one of the major texts on social change in the Third World, Alex Inkeles and David Smith fleetingly recognized that the difference in their division of the world into that which was modernized and that which was not was almost entirely a contrast between the West and the rest: "With the exception of Japan . . . all the major nations which we can consider modernized are part of the European tradition."78 Rather than pursue this theme, they decided not to be "arrogant" and instead broke up the Western tradition into components that could be used for measuring not "Westernization" Mass media in Nigeria have only had a marked impact since Independence in 1960. Oiily the newspapers and magazinies require the literacy that comes from schooling, but education is likely to lead to the higher income that facilitates the purchase of a radio or a television set or a cinema ticket and to the interest in the nontraditional world that makes these purchases more probable. All cinema films, most television films that portray family life, much of the magazine content, and a considerable proportion of the newspaper feature content are imported, and the models on which they are based are wholly imported from the West. The same message of nuclear family structure is relayed as is imparted by the schools. But another message is also presented in Nigeria: the great importance of sexual relations. This is luridly presented in newspaper and magazine features, news stories, and question and answer sections. Taking a single important example, the emphasis on sex in the widely read Lagos WVeekend must boost the market for contraceptives, because until recently the main interpretation has been on the excitement of relations outside marriage. But, with the increase in the proportion of educated (and partly Westernized) wives, it is inevitable that the message will be increasingly interpreted to mean also sexual relations within marriage. Such a change, certainly already well under way among the elite, cannot fail to affect the traditional system of family relationships (as has always been recognized in the society) and by strengthening the conjugal emotional bond will tend to nucleate the family, at first emotionally and ultimately economically.
Transition Theory Restated
In general, in societies of every type and stage of development, fertility behavior is rational, and fertility is high or low as a result of economic benefit to inidividuals, couples, or families in its being so. Whether high or low fertility is ecoiionoically rational is determinied by social conditions: primarily bv the direction of the intergenerational wealth flow. This flow has been from younger to older generations in all traditiolnal societies; anid it is apparenitly impossible (or, at least, examples are unknown) for a reversal of flow-at -the great divide-to occur before the family is largely niucleated both emotionally anid economically. A fair degree of emotional nucleation is needed for economic nucleation; and considerable amounts of both are required before parents are free to indulge in ever greater expenditures on their children.
Pre-divide populations do not aim at females conceiving as frequently as possible during the full reproductive span, and post-divide populations do not favor cbildlessness. The reasons are not basically economic; they are social, psychological, and physiological. It is possible, however, that the marginal economiiic advantage of each additional child in pre-divide society and disadvantage in post-divide society in some circumstances modifies the impact of the noneconomic determinants. Nevertheless, economic anialysis on its own canl do nothing to predict the timing of the divide and very little to explain the levels of fertility on either side of it-probably the course of fertility in the twentieth century West owes less to the economics of each additional child born than it does to the extent to which parental emotional and expenditure patternls have become focused on the children and the degree to which their society renders such focusing expensive in terms of alterniative uses for money, emotion, and time. Similarly, demographic evidence of fertility change may be valueless in termis of deducing movement toward the divide or estimating the probable timing of the reversal of the intergenerationial wvealth flow; the fertility chanige may well represent an adjustment of changing social, psychological, or physiological circumstances.84
Extreme external factors may influence this pattern. Pre-divide fertility may be restricted in the Kalahari Desert or on Tikopia because of very finite resources; and post-divide fertility was temporarily very high on the American frontier, where the wealth flow to children was relatively insignificant and where there were few alternative sources of labor and even company. The analysis carried out here has been largely based on Africa where access to land has been fairly unrestricted. The position may be somewhat more like Tikopia in densely settled agrarian areas in Asia. However, the little available evidence suggests that it is not, and that even there farming families do not on the whole see the extra birth as impoverishing and do not tighten their belts as the child grows. The explanation may be partly that we are deceived by a static analysis and see the household or family too little in terms of the coming and going of people over time; partly that the extra child does in due course add sufficiently to production; and partly that in the contemporary world the existence of urban employment takes sufficient strain off the need for providing more land.
For reasons that lie deep in its history, the family was increasingly economically nucleated in Western Europe centuries ago; indeed some social groups may have crossed the divide reversing the intergenerational wealth flow as early as the seventeenth century.85 This phenomenon had two demographic effects: a direct one, namely that Europe's population growth rate was lower than it would otherwise have been once mortality began to decline; an indirect one, in that European culture accepted the nuclear family as the basic unit of society and included a range of values associated with it among exports to other parts of the world.
An emphasis must be placed here on the export of the European social system as well as its economic system. It is as absurd to deny that this is the central feature of our times as to deny the significance of the Hellenization of southwest Asia, the Romanization of the Mediterranean and western Europe, and the Sinoization of much of southeast and central Asia in other periods. The issue is not whether Western social structure is better or even whether it is more suited to modernization; it is merely that the West has been able to export it because of the overwhelming economic strength it derived from the industrial revolution.
From the demographic viewpoint, the most important social exports have been the concept of the predominance of the nuclear family with its strong conjugal tie and the concept of concentrating concern and expenditure on one's children. The latter does not automatically follow from the former, although it is likely to follow continuing Westernization; but the latter must be preceded by the former. There probably is no close relationship in timing between economic modernization and fertility-and, if true, this may be the most important generalization of our time. If another culture had brought economic development, a culture with a much less nucleated family system, industrialization might well have proceeded far beyond its present level in the Third World without reversing the intergenerational flow of wealth. Conversely, in the present situation, family nucleation and the reversal of the intergenerational wealth flow are likely to penetrate deeply into the Third World in the next half century, almost independently of the success of industrialization, and, almost inevitably, they will guarantee slower global population growth.
Several subsidiary points about the export of the Western economic and social systems should be made. First, this export has made both mortality and fertility declines possible in the Third World. Public health measures were acceptable deep in traditional society, and this has been taken as evidence of the reality of the props, which were so constructed as to encourage the desire for low mortality and high fertility. The props are in fact needless: in pre-divide society economic prosperity increased with the number of surviving children-the noneconomic restraints on fertility were more on the number of pregnancies and on the time-span of reproduction than on nuimbers of survivors. Second, the whole system of extended family obligationis an-d the flow of wealth from younger to older generations may be disrupted by political means (Chin-a is the clearest example) with exactly the same effect in reducing fertility (although net wealth flows in a commune are probably relatively low, they are almost certainly from the old to the young). Third, the imminienice of the reversal of the wealth flow and of declining fertility is usually hidden because of the increased economic benefits from high fertility in the moderniizinig economy of pre-divide transitional society. And fourth, the attemipts to slow associationis over time between mlortality decline and various economiic developmeent indices on one hanid and fertility decline on the other are probably valueless; even where there are direct relationships they usually cannot be proved because of the tendency for so many economic anid social chaniges to move together.
A final note should perhaps be added on the more theoretical aspect of populationi growvth in primiiitive societies. It can be argued that mortality is determnined by environm-ient, way of life, aind technology, and varies widely among primitive anid traditionial societies. Yet, demonstrably, population growth rates over long periods have been very low, thus establishing that fertility levels must have approxinmated mortality levels. One can go further anid mainitaini that this means that mllortality levels determined fertility levels, an argumient that not only supports the concepts of props but implies that they were subject to strengthening or relaxing until the right level was reached. A more plausible reading of the African tribal situation, however, is that fertility levels were established independently. Where they were above mortality levels, population grew, and the tribe expanded its area through warfare with its neighbors. When expansion was successfully opposed, mortality rates climbed to meet fertility rates: first, because of increasingly unsuccessful warfare and, subsequently, because of growing pressure on limited resources. Where fertility levels were below mortality levels, the tribe died out.
Research Implications
If the society is at every stage rational, and economically rational at that, then it can be studied employing economic tools, as long as it is understood that the researchers must accept the society's own ends. Those ends cain be researched only by students of society, and their techniques alone -and not those of economic inquiry-can attempt to predict the approach to the divide where the wealth flow reverses.
First-class fieldwork on wealth flows in pre-divide societies is urgently needed, and that research must start with the identification of all possible types of mobile wealth and the development of methods for detecting flows. A good study of a single village would be worth a great deal; defective work on a nation could be dangerously misleading. Crosssectional studies have some value, but it will be necessary to build up life-cycle models. Specialized investigations might attempt to discover why children do not seem to press on resources in agrarian areas even when these areas are densely settled.
Sociological and anthropological work is needed to define the extent of the true extended families of obligation and to measure the internal wealth flows. It will also be necessary to measure the strength of each obligation bond-the circumstances (and the likelihood of those circumstances occurring) that will bring it into play and the probable volume of the wealth flow under given conditions. The study of the changing family and the measurement of movement toward the social, emotional, and economic nucleation of the conjugal family are important.
A combined social science assault will probably be needed on the circumstances and conditions of the reversal of the wealth flow-and on the time taken for the flow from the older to the younger generation to grow to such an extent that it exerts a real impact on fertility control decisions.
We also need studies that can easily be done in association with family planning action programs. We must find out the real reasons people want contraceptives and the extent to which contraception has anything to do with restricting fertility. Subtle and sympathetic studies in depth of both demographic innovators and contraceptive innovators are essential for action programs.
Finally, we need to know a lot more about the effect on the family of the lessons learned from the media and in school. Much effort has gone into distinguishing the population content of high school lessons but little study has been done on the family structure almost inadvertently taught in the elementary school.
The major implication of this analysis is that fertility decline in the Third World is not dependent on the spread of industrialization or even on the rate of economic development. It will of course be affected by such development in that modernization produces more money for schools, for newspapers, and so on; indeed, the whole question of family nucleation cannot arise in the nonmonetized economy. But fertility decline is more likely to precede industrialization and to help bring it about than to follow it. 
For example, in the Nigerian
Segment of the Changing African Fam--ily Project, respondents were asked, "If someone offered yoni a good job for three years, but you could only take it if you puit off having a baby for that time, would youi be prepared to try to stop having a baby for three years?" Only one-quarter of both women and men replied "No" and that response was not much higher even in remote villages. Very few Nigerians would be offered a good job (defined by most as meaning one in the modern, white-collar sector) and fewer still with a guaranteed period of employment. In practically no case would a woman have to agree not to have a child (and never in the case of imien). Should such an extraordinary offer ever he made, of course many might opt for the good job. The fundamental fact about developing economies is that choices of this kind do not exist and, therefore, a question of this kind is notlargely between spouses and toward their nonadult children is a very recent phenomenon almost everywhere except in the West. In spite of Murdock's followers' attempts to show resemblances between Eskimo and Western families, the former in fact have traditionally shared all the food they cauight, and it is hardly possible that a nuclear family could improve its diet at the expense of others ( see Graburn, cited in note 22 above).
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